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A simple dynamic general equilibrium model of savings and investment is
populated by agents with Kreps-Porteus preferences. Households are het-
erogeneous in their risk aversion, which explains the negative relationship
between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty. Agents trade a
riskless assets to share the aggregate risk, so that in equilibrium a higher
uncertainty induces the low risk-averse individuals to increase their posi-
tion in the risky asset, and the highly risk averse agents to increase their
share of safe bonds. This portfolio eﬀect increases the certainty-equivalent
future returns; in response to this rise, savings and investment decrease
due to a limited willingness to substitute consumption over time.
Keywords: Aggregate investment; uncertainty; risk aversion; heterogene-
ity.
JEL classiﬁcation: D92; E22.
3 341 Introduction1
While the available empirical evidence suggests that an increase in uncer-
tainty has negative eﬀects on capital accumulation, the theoretical litera-
ture on competitive ﬁrms’ investment decisions points to a positive rela-
tionship between uncertainty and investment.
This discrepancy between empirical evidence and economic theory can
be cleared taking into explicit account agents heterogeneity. In our compet-
itive equilibrium set-up investors diﬀer in their degree of relative risk aver-
sion, and — as in Coen-Pirani (2005) — they can trade safe bonds. Since an
increase in risk enhances the returns on capital in the tradition of Hartman
(1972) and Abel (1983), a higher uncertainty induces low risk-averse indi-
viduals to increase their position in the risky asset, while high risk-averse
families increase their share of safe bonds. These portfolio eﬀects imply
that not only the expected return, but also the certainty-equivalent return
increase for most investors. A higher certainty-equivalent capital income
induces an increase in consumption, and hence a reduction in investment,
if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low so that investors per-
ceive a strong incentive to smooth their utility levels over time. This result
contrasts with that obtained by Saltari and Ticchi (2007), who consider an
economy identical to our one, but for the fact that it is populated with a
representative agent. They disentangle the role of risk aversion from that of
intertemporal substitution, ﬁnding that an increase in uncertainty reduces
the certainty-equivalent return on capital. This induces higher savings and
investments whenever a representative agent is unwilling to substitute con-
sumption intertemporally. Accordingly, Saltari and Ticchi argue that the
negative investment-uncertainty relationship cannot be explained by risk
aversion, when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution takes realistic
values.
The risk sharing channel we underscore is fully operational in competi-
tive environments, so that we do not need to resort to market imperfections
or investment irreversibilities to explain the negative response of aggregate
investment to uncertainty.
The model is solved by means of numerical techniques; our simulations
1I am grateful to Robert Chirinko, Luca Colombo, Marco Cozzi, Marco Maﬀezzoli,
Hervè Roche and Joseph Zeira for valuable comments and suggestions. I also thank for
their useful feedbacks seminar participants at the 5th Polhia Workshop (Paris Sciences
Po, 2011) and at the 26thE.E.A. Annual Conference (Oslo, 2011). Financial support
from the European Community Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013) under
Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities, grant agreement n. 225408, project “Mone-
tary, Fiscal and Structural Policies with Heterogeneous Agents (POLHIA)” is gratefully
acknowledged.
5 5consider values for the average risk aversion and for its degree of hetero-
geneity across agents which are consistent with those documented in several
contributions (Barsky et al., 1997, Kimball et al. 2008, 2009). In our base-
line exercise we match aggregate uncertainty with the GDP variance, we
then consider the eﬀects of portfolio constraints framed in line with those
prescribed by the U.S. regulation, and ﬁnally we match uncertainty with
the stock market volatility. In all cases, the relationship between aggregate
investment and aggregate uncertainty is negative when the other parame-
ters characterizing our competitive economy take realistic values.
Related literature
While in the early ninety the contributions based on aggregate data
did not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative investment-uncer-tainty re-
lation2, the more recent analysis tends to be conclusive. For example,
Aizenman and Marion (1999), using a sample of 46 developing countries
over the period 1970-1992 ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative relation
between volatility and private investment when standard controls are in-
cluded among the explanatory variables. According to Caselli et al. (2003),
the reduction in investment that took place in the main European countries
in the 1990s can partly be explained by the increase in demand variability.
Most of the contributions based on micro data clearly point to a nega-
tive investment-uncertainty relationship. Leahy and Whited (1996) analyze
600 U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms for the period 1981-87, proxing uncertainty
for each company as the variance of its equity returns, and as the covari-
ance of its returns with the market as a whole. They ﬁnd evidence of a
negative correlation between investment and the ﬁrm’s variance of returns,
while the covariance of returns with the market portfolio is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. Robust evidence is provided for a cross-section of Italian
ﬁrms by Guiso and Parigi (1999), who use a proxy of uncertainty based on
managers’ perception of demand uncertainty. They ﬁnd that an increase
in uncertainty has negative eﬀects that are stronger for ﬁrms with a rele-
vant market power, or characterized by high irreversibilities. When both
the market power and the degree of irreversibility are low, the investment-
2Goldberg (1993) analyzes the impact of exchange rate volatility on U.S. aggregate
investment over the period 1970-1990 using quarterly data, without ﬁnding a signiﬁcant
eﬀect. According to Huizinga (1993), an increase in uncertainty in real wages leads
to a sizeable negative impact on aggregate investment; an increase in inﬂation uncer-
tainty reduces aggregate investment as well, but uncertainty in real prices tends to favor
investment. For an extensive discussion, refer to Carruth et al. (2000).
6 6uncertainty relationship is still negative, although less signiﬁcant.3 Ghosal
and Loungani (2000) using a panel of US ﬁrms, ﬁnd that the negative
impact of uncertainty of investment is substantially greater in industries
composed of small ﬁrms. Bloom et al. (2007) use ﬁrm level data for 672
publicly traded UK manufacturing ﬁrms for the period 1972-1991. They
quantify uncertainty following Leahy and Whited (1996), and ﬁnd that the
most signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on investment is obtained when considering
an interaction term involving uncertainty and sales. An increase in uncer-
tainty negatively aﬀects investment, too, while the level of past uncertainty
is less signiﬁcant. Chirinko and Schaller (2009) using a panel of U.S. ﬁrms
in the period 1980-2001 ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of various uncer-
tainty measures on the discount rate used by ﬁrms for investment decisions,
suggesting that uncertainty may reduce the capital stock.
The empirical evidence can hardly be interpreted by the stream of lit-
erature following Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983). These papers analyze
competitive economies in which ﬁrms must incur an adjustment cost when
deciding upon their capital level, while some other productive input, usu-
ally referred to as “labor”, can be freely adjusted after the realization of
the stochastic process. In this framework, the investment-uncertainty re-
lationship is usually positive. When the price is high, a ﬁrm can increase
production by adjusting the ﬂexible inputs, while, if the price is low, out-
put is reduced. Therefore, the asymmetry in the timing of decisions im-
plies the convexity of the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue of capital in the price
shock. Hence, a mean preserving spread in the output price increases the
expected marginal revenue of capital and therefore the ﬁrm’s investment
activity, which is the “ﬂexibility eﬀect”.
When the elasticity of demand is ﬁnite, as in Caballero (1991), the
incentive to adjust the production level in response to a demand shock is
less important. In fact, when a ﬁrm increases output following a positive
shock, it brings down the goods price. Caballero shows that asymmetries
in the adjustment costs also play an important role: to reduce the risk
of suﬀering a high resale costs, a ﬁrm is inclined to reduce its investment
when uncertainty increases. In his model, the interplay of these two eﬀects
may lead to a negative investment-uncertainty relation.
Caballero analyses a case of partial irreversibility, and indeed many con-
tributions incorporating various types of irreversibilities have found a nega-
tive eﬀect of risk on investment. In an uncertain environment, if conditions
worsen, the irreversibility constraint may become binding, which generates
3Using a similar methodology, Fuss and Vermeulen (2008) estimate a negative relation
between investment and demand uncertainty for Belgian ﬁrms.
7 7a “value of waiting”. When business conditions become more volatile, this
eﬀect becomes stronger. However, Abel and Eberly (1999) considering a
model with complete irreversibility, highlight that irreversibility and un-
certainty have two conﬂicting eﬀects on the long-run capital stock, and
hence on investment. One is the increase in the value of waiting described
above, which tends to reduce the capital stock. But Abel and Eberly also
identify what they call the “hangover eﬀect”: investment irreversibility
prevents the ﬁrm from selling capital when the marginal revenue product
of capital is low, so that the average long-run capital stock is higher in
the presence of irreversibility than in the more traditional case with full
reversibility. Higher uncertainty reinforces both the value of waiting eﬀect
and the hangover eﬀect, so that no unambiguous result can be obtained.4
When investment, besides being irreversible, is also indivisible, the
value of waiting is higher.5 In fact, not only the irreversibility constraint
may become binding if conditions worsen, but also the ﬁrm — sinking an in-
vestment project — loses the possibility of investing in the future in a more
favorable situation. When investment is indivisible, the value of waiting
substantiates in the fact that ﬁrms invest only if the marginal revenue of
capital is higher than a threshold exceeding the Jorgensonian user cost
of capital. Nevertheless, the eﬀects of uncertainty on investment are not
clear cut. In a decision theoretic framework, Sarkar (2000) ﬁnds that a
more volatile project may attain sooner larger values, so that the thresh-
old that makes it optimal to invest can be reached earlier. In imperfectly
competitive markets, the delaying eﬀect of the value of waiting may be un-
dermined by the fear of being preempted (and temporarily excluded from
the market) by competitors. Mason and Weeds (2010) underscore this
point in a duopoly in which the leader retains a proﬁt advantage once the
follower has sunk the investment, showing that an increase in uncertainty
may anticipate the leader’s investment. Bouis et al. (2009) discuss an
oligopoly composed of three ﬁrms. In their framework, when entries are
sequential, the opposing forces of the value of waiting and of preemption
have a net eﬀect on the timing of investment of each investor that depends
on the position of the ﬁrm in the entry sequence.
To explain the negative relationship between investment and uncer-
tainty in competitive markets, several contributions have considered the
role of risk aversion in general equilibrium frameworks. Craine (1989) de-
4Notice that, if the ﬁrm has no capital stock, the hangover eﬀect does not operate
while the value of waiting eﬀect is at work. Accordingly, in this case an increase in
uncertainty with investment irreversibility lowers the level of capital stock compared to
the case with reversibility.
5Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide an excellent survey of the early literature.
8 8velops a multi-sector model to assess whether risk aversion — calling for
a reduction of investment in sectors becoming riskier — may overrun the
ﬂexibility eﬀect highlighted by Hartman and Abel. With an intertemporal
utility function logarithmic in consumption (and thus characterized by a
low degree of risk-aversion), Craine ﬁnds that the capital allocated to the
sectors facing more uncertainty decreases if the number of sectors is low.
In this case, every sector contributes signiﬁcantly to aggregate uncertainty
and therefore it is perceived as very risky. In Zeira (1990), productive sec-
tors diﬀer in the capital/labour ratio. Higher real wage uncertainty shifts
capital from labor intensive sectors toward capital intensive ones, which
are less risky. Craine and Zeira concentrate on the eﬀect of uncertainty on
the reallocation of savings and investment across sectors, therefore, even if
they adopt a general equilibrium framework, in their papers there are no
eﬀects of uncertainty on aggregate investment.6 Saltari and Ticchi (2007)
analyze separately the role of risk aversion and that of intertemporal substi-
tution in a dynamic general equilibrium model of investment and savings.
In their model, the classic ﬂexibility eﬀect is at play: because ﬁrms can
substitute labor for capital after observing the realization of the stochas-
tic disturbance, the return to capital is convex with respect to the shock.
Therefore, the expected return to capital is increasing in the volatility of
the disturbance. But a risk averse individual takes her decisions consid-
ering the certainty equivalent return on capital and not the return itself
(this is what they dub the risk-aversion eﬀect).7 When agents are risk
averse, the increase in future returns may actually involve a reduction in
the certainty equivalent return; in Saltari and Ticchi this is the case even
with a mild degree of relative risk aversion. The reduction in (perceived)
future returns creates an incentive to invest less and hence to increase cur-
rent consumption; when the representative agent is willing to substitute
consumption intertemporally, this incentive actually induces a reduction
in investment. On the contrary, when the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution is realistically low, savings and aggregate investment increase to
smooth the utility levels over time.8 Hence, Saltari and Ticchi conclude
6In Craine’s framework, the increase in aggregate risk does not aﬀect aggregate in-
vestment because the household’s utility function is logarithmic. Accordingly, aggregate
savings (and investment) are a constant fraction of total output. In the overlapping gen-
erations model of Zeira it is assumed that each member of the young generation saves
entirely the real wage she gets.
7Saltari and Ticchi build on Nakamura (1999), who obtained a similar result in a
dynamic partial equilibrium model with CRRA preferences.
8Sandmo (1970) analyzed a model in which the relative risk aversion and the recipro-
cal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are constrained to be identical. In his
9 9that risk aversion cannot explain a negative relationship between aggregate
investment and aggregate uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the model and characterizes the recursive equilibrium. Section 3 consider
the household maximization problem. Section 4 solves numerically the
model and presents the simulation results. Section 5 draws the conclusions.
The Appendixes contain the more technical material.
2 The model
This section describes a discrete time dynamic general equilibrium model
in which investors — who are heterogeneous in their degree of risk aversion
— trade in stock and riskless assets in order to share aggregate uncertainty.
2.1 The timing of decisions
At the beginning of period t, households decide how to allocate their wealth
for the period, and ﬁrms decide how much capital to use. Then the produc-
tivity shock takes place, and ﬁrms — after having observed the realization
of the shock — adjust the amount of labor employed. At the end of pe-
riod t, ﬁrms obtain and sell output, pay out wages and dividends, and
ﬁnally households decide upon their period t consumption level, thereby
determining also their wealth for period t + 1.
Figure 1 shows the time line. The assumption that each ﬁrm can ad-
just the amount of labor employed within the period is standard in the
literature. Many contributions, such as Hartman (1972), Abel (1983), Ca-
ballero (1991) and Lee and Shin (2000), assume that the ﬁrm chooses its
capital level after the realization of the shock, incurring in an installation
cost which induces the convexity of the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue. Instead,
we assume that capital must be decided upon in advance without paying
an adjustment cost. Our assumption can be interpreted as depicting a
situation in which installation costs rapidly increase with the compression
of the time span during which investment is implemented: when invest-
ment is planned in advance, it involves negligible adjustment costs; on the
contrary, a late implementation brings about prohibitively high expenses.
While a short installation period actually increases the adjustment costs,
model, a mean-preserving spread in the rate of return of future investment increases the
expected marginal utility of future consumption, thereby inducing a tendency toward
higher savings (and investment); however, an increase in savings would also positively
aﬀect the variance of future consumption, an undesirable eﬀect for a risk-averse indi-
vidual. As is well known, with CRRA preferences the former eﬀect is stronger than the
latter when the relative risk aversion index is larger than 1.
10 10Shock  realizes




Period t portfolio decision
Firms choose Kt
Consumption decision
Figure 1: The time line.
we underscore that our assumption, besides being analytically convenient,
preserves the convexity of the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue, which is the crucial
ingredient for the Hartman-Abel ﬂexibility eﬀect.
2.2 The technology
Competitive ﬁrms operate a constant returns to scale Cobb Douglas pro-
duction function, Yt = BtK1−α
t Lα
t , in which Yt is output, Kt is the stock
of capital at time t, Lt is the labour employed, and Bt is a productiv-
ity shock. We assume that Bt = Beθt, in which B is constant and θt is
an identically and independently distributed normal random variable with
variance σ2 and mean ¯ θ−0.5σ2. Because the productivity shock is distrib-
uted as a log-normal random variable, E[Bt] = Be
¯ θ, which implies that
the expected value of the shock does not depend on σ2, being a function of
¯ θ only. Moreover, the log-normality of the shock implies that its variance
is increasing in σ2. Hence, a higher σ2 — raising the variance of the multi-
plicative shock — increases the degree of uncertainty without aﬀecting the
expected productivity.
The assumption of an i.i.d. shock may seem limiting. However, an
autocorrelated productivity shock would call for an additional state vari-
able in the model, which slows down the numerical simulations, but which
does not signiﬁcantly aﬀects our results. In this case, in fact, what makes
the investors uncertain is uniquely the variance of the innovation in the
process, as it happens with independent shocks.9
9Moreover, the i.i.d. assumption is made in Craine (1989), Zeira (1990) and Saltari
11 112.3 Preferences
The economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived families, who
derive utility from consumption and supply labor incurring in a disutility
cost. The households are indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Every family is character-
ized by a Kreps-Porteus non-expected utility, modeled as in Epstein and
Zin (1989) and in Weil (1990). In contrast to the standard expected utility
preferences, this speciﬁcation allows for the independent parameterization
of attitudes toward risk and intertemporal substitutability. All the house-
holds share the same subjective discount factor under certainty, β, and the
same elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/R. However, they diﬀer in
the coeﬃcient of risk aversion for timeless lotteries, γ.10 There exist J types
of families characterized by diﬀerent coeﬃcients of relative risk-aversion.
With no loss of generality, let γj < γj+1, for j = 1,2,...,J − 1.
The risk-aversion of each family may change over time, due to aging
or to reﬂect the characteristics of newly born members of the family. This
eﬀect is modeled assuming that, in every period, there is a constant prob-
ability of transition from group j to group s, denoted by λjs. Obviously,
￿J
s=1 λjs = 1, for j = 1,2,...,J. The possibility of a change in risk-
aversion for our inﬁnitely lived families is considered not only because it
is realistic, but also because the wealth distribution, when risk aversion is
heterogeneous, may be dominated in the long run by one group of agents.
For example, Coen-Pirani (2004) identiﬁes the condition such that the less
risk-averse agents dominate the long-run wealth distribution in a model
with two groups of agents.11 Our assumption allows instead for a non-
degenerate long-run wealth distribution.
Denote by Ut,i(γj) the utility from time t onward of family i, charac-
terized by risk aversion γj. This is deﬁned recursively as:
and Ticchi (2007). Accordingly, maintaining this assumption allows for a direct com-
parison with the results presented in those papers.
10Our analysis suggests that, as long as R > 1, the diﬀerences in the elasticity of
substitution, while important quantitatively, do not alter the sign of the response of
individual savings to an increase of uncertainty. The same holds true for the subjective
discount parameter. Accordingly, if we considered a heterogeneity in R or in β, we would
obtain diﬀerent wealth distributions, but the same response of investment and savings
to uncertainty. Accordingly, we ignore the fact that the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution and the subjective discount factor may also be diﬀerent across agents (and
that they may vary over time).
11More recently, Roche (2011) shows how time discount rate, risk aversion and in-
tertemporal substitution contribute to shape the capital accumulation decisions. In his
model, the more eﬀectively patient agents dominate the wealth distribution, and they

















in which Ct,i is consumption, Lt,i is labor supplied by family i, φ is the
constant opportunity cost of supplying labor, and, for convenience, εj =
(1 − β)(1 − γj). Notice that the argument of the period t utility is a
linear combination of consumption and labor. This speciﬁcation — which
is the same adopted by Saltari and Ticchi (2007) — is convenient because
it guarantees that, in equilibrium, the real wage is constant, being equal to
the marginal disutility of labor. Accordingly, our results are not aﬀected
by the eﬀects of a change in the capital stock on wages and on the labor
supply.12
Et[.] denotes the expectation conditional on the information available
at the end of period t, so that the time t realization of the disturbance
is included in the relevant information set, and the decision taken at the
beginning of period t are based upon the period t − 1 information set.
Family i is endowed with capital stock Kt,i.
2.4 Markets and assets
In each period there exist a spot market for output, a labor market, an
equity market, and a market for the riskless bond. Output is taken as the
numeraire, and it is traded on a competitive market; the (nominal and
real) wage rate wt is determined on the labor market, which is competitive
as well.
Risky assets entitle to the ownership of capital, so that the price of one
equity is identical to the price of one unit of output, and hence it is equal to
1; each equity purchased at the beginning of period t entitles to a dividend
equal to D(Bt,Kt). The diﬀerences in the degree of risk aversion enrich
the possibility of ﬁnancial trading among agents. In fact, as in Coen-Pirani
12The assumption of a perfectly elastic labor supply is not crucial for our results.
Consider an economy characterized by a ﬁnite elasticity of labor supply, and assume
that an increase in uncertainty, raising the expected future return on capital, reduces
investment and the next period capital stock. In this case, the future demand for labor
is reduced. The equilibrium labor employment is lower, which exerts a negative eﬀect
on the (expected) marginal productivity of capital. This highlights the presence of an
indirect eﬀect on the return on capital that mitigates the direct eﬀect.
13 13(2005), the more risk-averse families can purchase riskless bond issued by
the less risk-averse agents.13 Riskless assets, issued at the beginning of
period t, are remunerated at the rate rt at the end of the same period
(i.e. when output is obtained). Notice that the riskless bond is in zero net
supply.
2.5 Budget constraints
Each family faces a portfolio problem, which needs to be solved before
deciding upon labor supply and consumption (refer to Fig. 1). At the
beginning of period t, family i, endowed with capital stock Kt,i has to
decide the share qt,i of its capital that — being invested in risky assets —
yields the return D(Bt,Kt). The remaining fraction 1 − qt,i is invested in
riskless assets, remunerated at the rate rt. The portfolio problem implies
that the intertemporal budget constraint for family i is:
Kt+1,i = ((1 + D(Bt,Kt))qt,i + (1 + rt)(1 − qt,i))Kt,i +wtLt,i −Ct,i, (1)


















In this economy, the homogeneity of the Kreps-Porteus utility implies that
stocks and bonds holdings, for any given interest rate and any given capital
stock, are proportional to individual wealth. Since each household’s assets
demand depends on her wealth, aggregate demand depends on the distri-
bution of aggregate wealth among investors, and so does the interest rate.
Denoting by Γt,i ∈ [0,1] the share of aggregate capital held by family i (i.e.
Γt,i ≡ Kt,i/Kt), and by Γt the {Γt,i} vector, we deﬁne, for compactness,
ρ(Bt,Kt,Γt,qt,i) ≡ (1 + D(Bt,Kt))qt,i + (1 + rt(Γt,Kt))(1 − qt,i),
13The fact that — in our framework — the less risk averse families issue riskless bond to
increase their equity holdings, stylizes the obtaining of credit from banks or from other
ﬁnancial institution, and also the purchases of equities issued by levered ﬁrms.
14 14so that the budget constraint (1) can be expressed as
Kt+1,i = ρ(Bt,Kt,Γt,qt,i)Kt,i + wtLt,i − Ct,i.


























Kt+1,i = ρ(Bt,Kt,Γt,qt,i)Kt,i + wtLt,i − Ct,i, (3)
Kt+1,h = ρ(Bt,Kt,Γt,qt,h)Kt,h + wtLt,h − Ct,h, for h ∈ [0,1], h ￿= i. (4)
Each household i needs to determine her time t portfolio choice qt,i at
the beginning of the period, when its information set does not include the
realization of the productivity shock, so Problem (2) is conditioned upon
the time t − 1 information set.
The representative ﬁrm’s maximization problem is static. Bearing in
mind that capital must be chosen at the beginning of each period, while
labor is decided upon after the realization of the productivity shock, the









t − wtLt − δKt
￿
. (5)
We now deﬁne the recursive equilibrium for this economy.
Deﬁnition 1 The recursive equilibrium is represented by:
• the families’ value functions {Vh(γj,Kt,h,Γt)}, for h ∈ [0,1] and
15 15j = 1,2,...J,
• the families’ decision rules {Ct,h,Lt,h,qt,h}, for h ∈ [0,1],
• the representative ﬁrm’s decision rules {Kt,Lt},
• the law of motion (4) for h ∈ [0,1],
• the interest rate rt(Γt,Kt), and the wage rate wt,
such that
• the value functions {Vh(γj,Kt,h,Γt)}, and decision rules {Ct,h, Lt,h,
qt,h}, for h ∈ [0,1] and j = 1,2,...J, solve problem (2) under constraint
(3), given the interest rate rt(Γt,Kt) and the wage rate wt, and given the
law of motion (4) for h ∈ [0,1];
• the decision rules {Kt,Lt} solve problem (5);

















• The law of motion (4) is consistent with the equilibrium for h ∈ [0,1].
The following two Sections are devoted to the characterization of the
equilibrium.
3 Individual optimization problems
This section describes the ﬁrms’ and the households’ optimization prob-
lems for given pricing functions, and for a given evolution of the wealth
distribution.
3.1 Firms
The timing of event implies that the representative ﬁrm’s problem is to be
solved by backward induction. Once the ﬁrm has decided upon the capital







t − wtLt − δKt,
where δ is the constant depreciation parameter. The optimal amount of
labor is given by ˆ Lt = [(α/wt)Bt]ηKt, where η ≡ 1/(1 − α). Notice that
η ∈ (1,∞) since α ∈ (0,1). Having chosen Lt = ˆ Lt, the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow
becomes: ξtB
η

















Accordingly, the amount of capital operated by ﬁrms is determined by
the supply provided by the households; the capital stock Kt is ﬁnanced by
issuing equities, each of which represents one unit of capital and carries
the right to obtain a payment of A
η
t − δ once production is completed, so
that D(Bt,Kt) = D(At) = A
η
t −δ. Notice that A
η
t represents the marginal
revenue product of capital at time t. Given that η > 1, the proﬁt function
is convex in the random variable as in Abel (1983), Hartman (1972), and
many others.
3.2 Households
We consider the individual family maximization problem for a given interest
rate function and for a given evolution of the wealth distribution.
The independence of the return on equities from the capital stock im-
plies that the riskless rate is independent from capital as well, which sim-
pliﬁes the solution of the household intertemporal problem.
Let rt(Γt) be the riskless rate, and deﬁne
ρ(At,Γt,qt,i) ≡ (1 + D(At))qt,i + (1 + rt(Γt))(1 − qt,i),
so that the budget constraint (3) becomes
Kt+1,i = ρ(At,Γt,qt,i)Kt,i + wtLt,i − Ct,i. (7)
Accordingly, households solve problem (2) under constraint (7), consid-
ering that the value function is independent from aggregate capital.
Each family decides upon the share of risky assets before the produc-
tivity shock takes place, while chooses her labor supply and consumption
17 17levels when the productivity shock is known. Working backward, ﬁrst, the
non-expected utility (2) is maximized with respect to Ct,i, Lt,i for a given
portfolio choice, and then the asset allocation problem is solved.
After some obvious simpliﬁcations, the ﬁrst order conditions become:























∂Ct,i = −1, and
∂Kt+1,i
∂Lt,i = wt.
Notice that the ratio between the ﬁrst order conditions (9) and (8)
yields φ = wt, so that the real wage is constant, being equal to the marginal
disutility of labour, a result paralleling that in Saltari and Ticchi (2007).





t , and the only source of variability for At is provided
by the realization of the stochastic shock θt.
Our guess of the value function for Problem (2) — inspired by that for







In the guess above, ψj(Γt) is a function of the wealth shares only, which
are known at the beginning of period t, while ρ(γj,At,Γt) is a function
depending also on the aggregate productivity shock and on the degree of
18 18risk aversion (through the agent’s optimal portfolio choice).14


































Ξjs(Γt+1) = λjsψs(Γt+1)1−R ￿
Et[ρ(γs,At+1,Γt+1)1−γs￿ 1−R
1−γs .
Moreover, Appendix A shows that it is also necessary that
ρ(γj,At,Γt) ≡ (1 + D(At))ˆ qt,i(Γt,γj) + (1 + rt(Γt))(1 − ˆ qt,i(Γt,γj)),
in which






Notice that the portfolio choice depends on the risk aversion parame-
ter, but not on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, a result which
is consistent with Svensson (1989). The elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution exerts an eﬀect only indirectly, through the wealth distribution.
As already highlighted, the diﬀerences in risk aversion enrich the pos-
sibility of ﬁnancial trading among agents: the more risk-averse families
can purchase riskless bonds issued by the less risk-averse agents, and in-
vest a larger share of their wealth in equities. The following proposition
characterizes the individual portfolio choices.
Proposition 2 If
r(Γt) < Et [A
η






14With homogeneous agents, the value function (10) specializes to the one proposed
by Saltari and Ticchi (2007) (refer to Appendix C).






for i ∈ [0,1], and for j = 1,2,...J.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix B.
The assumption r(Γt) < Et [A
η
t] − δ simply requires that the riskless
rate is lower than the expected returns on risky assets; it is always satisﬁed
in equilibrium for an economy populated by risk averse agents.
Taking a short position in riskless assets to ﬁnance her investment in
equities, an agent may expose herself to the risk of obtaining a negative
wealth level. This happens when the share in risky asset is high and the
realization of the productivity process is unfavorable (refer to the deﬁnition
of ρ(At,Γt,qt,i)). As wealth approaches zero, its marginal utility tends
to inﬁnite even for the least risk averse agents populating the economy.
The upper bound for the optimal portfolio shares ˆ qt,i in Proposition (2),
i.e. (1 + r(Γt))/(δ + r(Γt)), is the maximum value guaranteeing a ﬁnite
expected marginal utility of wealth.
4 Simulation results
To describe the eﬀect of an increase in uncertainty on investment, it is
necessary to solve the set of conditions (11-12) for all i and j, which can
be done only numerically. Accordingly, in this Section, we ﬁrst illustrate
the parameters’ values that we use, and then we oﬀer the results of several
simulation exercises.
4.1 Benchmark parameterization
The parameters characterizing preferences are discussed ﬁrst, and then the
technological parameters are considered.
4.1.1 Preference parameters
The reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, R, is ﬁxed
to 2. As long as R > 1, the value for this parameter does not aﬀect our
results. In fact, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution governs the
size of the impact of the ’ﬂexibility eﬀect’: the higher is R, the stronger is
the income eﬀect induced by an increase in the expected future return on
capital.
Since our model is calibrated using a time period equal to one year, let
β = 0.98. Sensible variations in the value of β do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
our results.
20 20The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion — governing the portfolio choices
— plays a crucial role. Most empirical works estimate this key parame-
ter using a CRRA utility function (which implies that the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are
linked). Within this literature, some recent studies use ﬁnancial market
data to assess the RRA index and highlight that it varies across investors.
Chiappori and Paiella (2011) use data from the Survey of Household In-
come and Wealth, run by the Bank of Italy. They focus on families holding
risky ﬁnancial assets (which means about one half of the total). According
to their estimate, the mean risk aversion in the population is 4.2, with a
median estimated at 1.7, which suggests the presence of a signiﬁcant het-
erogeneity in risk aversion across families. Chiappori and Paiella also ﬁnd
that 25% of the population has a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion larger
than 3.15
The assessment of the risk aversion based on ﬁnancial choices excludes
from the analysis the households which do not hold risky assets (typically,
a share ranging from 30% to 50%). One may think that these families
are more risk averse than those participating in the stock market. Indeed,
studies based on survey data ﬁnd high and heterogeneous degrees of risk
aversion. Barsky et al. (1997) analyzes the households covered by the
University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study (HRS) of 1992. Par-
ticipants in that survey were asked to respond to hypothetical questions
concerning their willingness to give up a share of their permanent income
in exchange for a probability of doubling their wage. Barsky et al. sug-
gest that two thirds of the participants in the survey are characterized by
a risk aversion parameter higher than 3.76; they ﬁnd that the remainder
is divided almost evenly into three groups, with risk aversion between 2
and 3.76, between 1 and 2, and below unity, respectively. The estimated
average relative risk aversion for the ﬁrst group is 15.8, for the second is
2.9, for the third is 1.5, while the least risk averse group is characterized
by a mean risk aversion of 0.7. When they consider the entire population,
the estimate for the mean of risk aversion is close to 12.16
15Among the recent papers which do not give prominence to preference heterogeneity,
Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) focus on the FTSE 100 and on the S&P 500 options,
providing estimates ranging from 1.97 to 9.52, while Bonaparte and Cooper (2009) take
into account the cost of portfolio adjustment, and ﬁnd that participants in the US stock
market show a curvature of the utility function just above 3.5.
16Halek and Eisenhauer (2001), considering as well the HRS 1992, focus only on the
2.376 families that purchased term life insurance, and compute relative risk aversion at
the individual level through the analysis of their income, wealth and insurance premium
rate. They ﬁnd that the average for the risk aversion parameter is 3.735, and that the
distribution is skewed to the right.
21 21Barsky et al. (1997) results may suﬀer from a status quo bias. Actually,
starting with the 1998 survey, the questions asked to respondents have been
rephrased to take this issue into account. This led Kimball et al. (2008) to
estimate an average risk aversion of 8.2, with a standard deviation of 6.8.
Moreover, the individuals in the sample considered by the HRS are
aged between 51 and 61. Because risk aversion tends to increase with age,
Kimball et al. (2009) analyze the participants to the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics 1996 with an age comprised between 20 and 69.17 Their estimate
for the average relative risk aversion is 4.2, a value signiﬁcantly lower than
the ones obtained using the HRS sample; their estimate for the standard
deviation is quite high, being 4.5.
The theoretical analysis in Saltari and Ticchi (2007) implies that the
higher the risk aversion, the lower is the subjective evaluation of the fu-
ture return on capital; moreover the lower the certainty equivalent return,
the higher is the representative agent saving, whenever she is unwilling
to substitute consumption intertemporally. Therefore, the higher is the
average relative risk aversion index, the more diﬃcult is to identify a neg-
ative investment uncertainty relation. Accordingly, although the values
suggested by Barsky et al. (1997) may be upward biased, they are useful
to test the robustness of the negative investment-uncertainty relation that
we identify.18
To limit the number of state variables in the system, our numerical
analysis considers three types of agents. We retain the lowest and the
highest values for the relative risk aversion parameter computed in Barsky
et al. (1997), while the two intermediate ones are merged, maintaining the
population average. Accordingly, our vector of the risk aversion parameters
is γ = [0.7, 2.2, 15.8].
The risk aversion of each family may change over time due to aging,
improvement in the educational attainments, and so on. Moreover, the
composition of the family may change, too. To encompass these eﬀects,
each family is assumed to face constant probabilities of transition to the
groups characterized by diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion; our simulations
consider three alternative parameterizations for the transition matrix. In
the ﬁrst, Λ = [λjs] is the identity matrix. While this choice — assuming
away the changes in relative risk-aversion — implies a degenerate long-run
17Participants in that survey were asked to respond to hypothetical questions similar
to those proposed by the HRS 1992.
18In Appendix D we present an array of simulations based on Kimball et al. (2009),
that conﬁrms our results.
22 22wealth distribution, it proves the least favorable for the attainment of a
negative eﬀect on investment of an increase in uncertainty. Then, the

















The choice of Λ￿ has been led by two considerations. First, we ﬁxed
λ11 = λ33 = 0.99 and λ12 = λ32 = 0.01 because the choice of a high persis-
tence for the highest and lowest risk aversion group makes more diﬃcult to
obtain a negative investment uncertainty relation. We then focus on the
intermediate group, choosing values that guarantee a long run wealth dis-
tribution matching the distribution of types found in Barsky et al. (1997).
Matrix Λ￿￿ has been obtained using the same criterion, but starting from the
possibly more realistic values λ11 = λ33 = 0.98 and λ12 = λ32 = 0.02.19
The existing evidence concerning the changes over time of the decision
makers’ attitude toward risk is scarce. Nevertheless, Kimball et al. (2009)
provide an interesting reference point. They estimate the family covaria-
tion of the risk tolerance within the PSID data, ﬁnding that the covariance
between mother and child implies a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.23 (statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 10% level), while the father-child covariance is 40%
lower. Our transition matrixes imply an autocorrelation of the risk aver-
sion index across families at a 30 periods distance that are higher than the
ones in Kimball et al. (2009) for the mother-child case.20 Accordingly, as
for the risk aversion coeﬃcients, our choices work against the attainment
of a negative investment uncertainty relation.
4.1.2 Technological parameter
The observed labor income share suggests α = 0.67; sensible variations
in the values of α do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our results. As for the de-
19In the absence of reliable data relating wealth to risk-aversion, we simply assume that
the wealth owned by a family is independent from the risk aversion index. Therefore,
we assume that the distribution of types described in Barsky et al. (1997) matches also
the wealth distribution across types. Accordingly, the choices for Λ￿ and Λ￿￿ guarantee
that
￿104+106
t=104 Γt,1 ￿ 0.11 and
￿104+106
t=104 Γt,2 ￿ 0.22 in the benchmark scenario.
20The 30 year period has been chosen since it is appropriate to stylize the time span
such that the role of decision maker is taken over by children. If we increase to 35
this time period, the correlation of the risk aversion index is still 50% higher in our
simulations than for the mother-child relation in Kimball et al. (2009).
23 23preciation parameter δ, several empirical investigations suggest that, for
non-residential buildings, the depreciation rate is around 5 percent. For
the private ﬁxed capital stock the estimates typically vary instead in the
range 11-16%. Accordingly, the choice δ ∈ [0.07 − 0.14] should be in or-
der. In our benchmark case, we ﬁx δ = 0.10. The much wider interval
δ ∈ [0.05−0.5] is then considered to favor the comparison with Saltari and
Ticchi (2007).
Since the stochastic disturbance θt is assumed to be log-normally dis-
tributed, recalling the deﬁnitions in Sub-section 2.2, the expected return
on capital can be expressed as
Et−1[A
η
t − δ] = Et−1[(ξBηeηθt − δ)] = (ξBηe
η(¯ θ+0.5(η−1)σ2) − δ), (13)
while the variance of the stock return is:
V art−1[A
η
t − δ] = V art−1[ξBηeηθt] = ξBηe2η¯ θ+η(η−1)σ2
(eη2σ2
− 1). (14)
Output is normalized so that ξBη = 1, and the expected return and
variance are matched with the U.S. data. In particular, let Et−1[(A
η
t −δ)] =
0.07, so that the capita growth is around 2% per year, and V art−1[A
η
t] =





¯ θ = 1












When α = 0.67 (so that η ￿ 3.03) and δ = 0.10, ¯ θ ￿ −0.5893, and
σ ￿ 0.0672.22
As for the wealth distribution, the ﬁrst two elements of Γt vary between
0 and 1, under the natural constraint Γt,1 + Γt,2 ≤ 1.
4.2 Numerical results for the benchmark case
The model is solved using a policy function iteration procedure.23
21Refer to Cohen-Pirani (2005) for a recent example of this approach.
22Calibrating our model using a shorter period — and hence reducing the expected
return and the standard deviation in proportion to the length of the period and to its
square root, respectively — produces result that are not weaker than the ones we present
in the following Sections.
23To solve the model numerically we discretize the state space for Γt: we choose 30
equally spaced nodes in [0,1] for the wealth shares belonging to low and intermediate risk
24 24For all the three alternative transition matrixes Λ, Λ￿, and Λ￿￿, the
portion of the state space in which an increase in future uncertainty reduces
the current investment is remarkably large.
The three panels of Figure 2 consider any possible wealth distribution
(i.e. Γt,1 ∈ [0,1], Γt,2 ∈ [0,1], with Γt,1 + Γt,2 ≤ 1) for the transition ma-
trixes described above. The shaded areas indicate where the investment-
uncertainty relation is positive.24 In all the panels, when the wealth shares
belonging to low- and intermediate-risk averse families corresponds to the
relative frequency of these agents in Barsky et al. (1997) (i.e. 11% and
22% respectively), we ﬁnd that an unexpected increase in uncertainty re-
duces investment. The border between the shaded and the white areas
represents the cases in which investment is independent from future un-
certainty. On this curve, the average risk aversion (obtained by weighting
the risk-aversion index with the wealth shares) ranges from 10.0 to 13.5 in
Panel (a), from 13.5 to 15.3 in Panel (b), and from 14.9 to 15.5 in Panel
(c). Accordingly, with realistic values for risk-aversion, an increase in un-
certainty depresses ﬁrms’ investment, as it is suggested by the empirical
literature.
aversion agents. Therefore we construct a two-dimensional grid composed of 450 points.
The distribution for At is approximated using the 10-points Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
Because with Kreps-Porteus preferences the marginal utility of consumption depends
on the expected value of the marginal utility of future wealth, an initial guess for Γt+1
in each quadrature point for At+1, must be provided; an initial guess for the functions
ψs(Γt+1), s = 1,2,3 is also supplied. The latter guess is based on the function that
would have been valid in the corresponding representative agent case.
Our algorithm features the following two main steps.
Step 1. The routine computes
Ξjs(Γt+1) = λjsψs(Γt+1)1−R[Et[ρs(At+1,Γt+1)1−γs]
1−R
1−γs for j,s = 1,2,3.
Exploiting Eq. (A.2), the Ξjs(Γt+1) are used to determine, for every element in Γt and
for every quadrature node of At, the period t + 1 wealth distribution (Γ￿
t+1) that is
consistent with the guess for ψs(Γt+1), s = 1,2,3. Our routines iterates on Γ￿
t+1 until
the maximum distance between two successive approximations is below 10(−6).
Step 2. For the period t + 1 wealth distribution obtained in the previous step, we
approximate the functions ψs(Γt+1), for s = 1,2,3. This is performed exploiting condi-
tion (11) to obtain ψ￿
j(Γt) for j = 1,2,3, and using an interpolation for approximating
ψ￿
s(Γt+1). Our algorithm iterates until the maximum absolute diﬀerence between the
values of two successive approximations for ψs(Γt+1) is below 10(−6).
Having obtained the functions ψ￿
s(Γt+1), our routines exploits them as a new initial
condition for Step 1, producing a new Γ￿
t+1 wealth distribution, consistent with the new
ψ￿
s(Γt+1). Our algorithm then iterates over Steps 1 and 2 until the wealth distribution
(for each quadrature node for At) and the functions ψs(Γt+1) have converged.
24These results have been obtained computing the investment level for each produc-
tivity node, and then considering the average.
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Figure 2: Panels (a), (b) and (c) display where the investment-uncertainty
relation is positive, for Λ, Λ￿ and Λ￿￿, respectively.
To interpret these results, consider what happens to agents’ portfolios
when variability increases. In our framework two opposing eﬀects are at
play. First, due to the increase in uncertainty, agents would reduce —
ceteris paribus — their share of equities. But an increase in uncertainty
raises the expected returns to capital, which would prompt an increase in
the holdings of risky assets. When an agent’s risk aversion is suﬃciently
low, the second eﬀect is stronger than the ﬁrst, so that she decides to hold
a larger share of equities, and the expected return on her wealth increases.
Because she is weakly risk averse, the certainty equivalence of her expected
return increases, too, so that the ﬂexibility eﬀect dominates, and savings
and investment decrease. Consider then a strongly risk averse agent. For
her, the second eﬀect is weaker than the ﬁrst one, and she reduces her share
of risky assets. The increase in the expected return on her wealth is small,
due to the reduction in the high-yielding risky equities, but, for the same
reason, the certainty equivalence may increase. Our simulations show that,
this is indeed the case unless the strongly risk-averse individuals’ share of
wealth is high. In this event, the highly risk averse agents bear almost
the entire aggregate risk, so that the portfolio adjustment is necessarily
limited and the risk-aversion eﬀect dominates, as it would have done in
a representative agent framework. When Γt,1 = Γt,2 = 0, if there is no
possibility of a change in γj, the model reduces to a homogeneous agent
framework, in which risk-aversion is 15.8. We veriﬁed that, in this case, our
routine obtains a result for the heterogeneous agents case that is identical
to the one for the representative agent model.
Small probabilities of a change in the degree of risk-aversion imply a
signiﬁcant enlargement of the area in which the uncertainty-investment
relation is negative. In fact, every agent is aware of the probability of
26 26changing her type, which is taken into full account. Accordingly, an agent
characterized e.g. by a high risk-aversion knows that she may become less
risk averse in the future. When most agents are highly risk averse, an
increase in uncertainty induces the few who are not to raise signiﬁcantly
their share of risky assets. Hence the certainty-equivalence of their fu-
ture wealth is augmented (so that their savings decrease). When a highly
risk-averse individual faces the probability of becoming less risk averse,
she takes into account the possible increase in the certainty-equivalent of
future wealth, which decreases her current savings. This eﬀect proves to
be relevant enough to signiﬁcantly shrink the state space in which the
investment-uncertainty relation is positive. With the transition matrix Λ￿
and Λ￿￿, even when Γt,1 = Γt,2 = 0, the reaction of investment to an increase
in uncertainty is less negative than in the representative agent model.
We conclude the analysis of our benchmark case by presenting the his-
togram of the stationary distribution of wealth for our economy when the
transition matrixes are Λ￿ and Λ￿￿ (so that E[Γt,1] ￿ 0.11 and E[Γt,1] ￿
0.22).25 Notice that, when Γt,1 is relatively large (consider e.g. Γt,1 ≥ 0.12)
the conditional variance of Γt,2 is limited. This happens because in these
cases, the share of wealth belonging to the least risk averse families is large
enough to allow them to absorb most of the aggregate risk. Accordingly,
the agents in the intermediate group choose a portfolio close to the average
one, and their wealth share is fairly stable. Instead, when Γt,1 is small, the
burden of bearing a relevant share of the aggregate risk rests upon the fam-
ilies characterized by the intermediate degree of risk-aversion. Accordingly,
the variance for Γt,2 is signiﬁcant as well.
4.3 Alternative scenarios
The robustness of our results is tested considering various alternative sce-
narios.
4.3.1 Portfolio constraints
The portfolio eﬀect we have underscored implies, in the benchmark case,
the choice of a large wealth share in risky assets for the low risk-averse fam-
ilies. Actually, when Γt,1 = 0.11 and Γt,2 = 0.22, the equity portfolio share
for the low γ families is around 4.83 in all cases. In the U.S., the Federal
Reserve Bank regulation allows an investor to borrow up to the 50% of the
25To obtain Fig. 3 we generated 1.010.000 observations by drawing random numbers;
we then used the computed policy function, and the equilibrium law of motions for Γt.
The ﬁrst 10.000 observations have been discarded to reduce the eﬀects of the initial
condition for Γt on the distribution.
27 27Figure 3: Histogram of the stationary wealth distributions.
total purchase value of equities when opening a new position;26 moreover,
a position can be maintained as long as the amount of the initial loan is
worth less than the 75% of the purchased portfolio. These requirements im-
ply qt,j ≤ 2 and qt,j ≤ 4, respectively.27 Because our economy responds to
an increase in volatility by transferring risk to the less risk-averse families,
one might be induced to think that binding portfolio constraints severely
weaken our result. It turns out that this is not the case. Adding the con-
straint qt,j ≤ 4 in a variant of our model otherwise characterized by the
benchmark parameterization, we obtain the results shown in Fig. 4. On
the border between the shaded and the white areas — i.e. where investment
is independent from future uncertainty — the average risk aversion ranges
from 9.6 to 12.5 in Panel (a), from 12.8 to 14.4 in Panel (b), and from
14.3 to 14.8 in Panel (c). While the portfolio constraint reduces the area
in which the investment-uncertainty relationship is negative, this eﬀect is
small. In particular, for all the transition matrixes, an increase in uncer-
tainty reduces investment for Γt = {0.11, 0.22, 0.67}. When the constraint
is binding for the low risk aversion agents but not for the intermediate
risk aversion ones, an increase in uncertainty induces the latter to increase
26This prescription is part of "Regulation T" that can be found at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_99/12cfr220_99.html
27In most papers dealing with credit constraints (but not e.g. in Coen-Pirani, 2005),
the amount an agent can borrow is constant over time. Instead, we assume that this
amount depends positively on her wealth. As a family’s wealth evolves over time, so
does its maximum borrowing.
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Figure 4: Panels (a), (b) and (c) display where the investment-uncertainty
relation is positive under portfolio constraint qt,j ≤ 4, for Λ, Λ￿ and Λ￿￿,
respectively.
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Figure 5: Panels (a), (b) and (c) display where the investment-uncertainty
relation is positive under portfolio constraint qt,j ≤ 2, for Λ, Λ￿ and Λ￿￿,
respectively.
their portfolio shares. This allows the mechanism described in the previous
Section to remain operational, although it becomes quantitatively weaker.
When the constraints qt,j ≤ 2 is considered, we obtain the results shown
in Fig 5. On the border between the shaded and the white areas, the
average risk aversion ranges from 9.8 to 11.3 in Panel (a), from 11.6 to
13.3 in Panel (b), and from 12.6 to 14.7 in Panel (c). With the transition
matrixes Λ￿ and Λ￿￿, the eﬀect of uncertainty on current investment remains
negative for Γt = {0.11, 0.22, 0.67}.
4.3.2 Stock market volatility
In the benchmark parameterization the output variance is matched with
the U.S. GDP data. As it is well known, when properly normalized, the
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Figure 6: Panels (a) and (b) and (c) display where the investment-
uncertainty relation is positive when Et−1[(At − δ)] = 0.152, for Λ, Λ￿,
and Λ￿￿ respectively.
stock market volatility is far higher that the output variance. Because
our argument relies on portfolio adjustments, it is interesting to test the
robustness of our results to a value for the variance of returns stylizing the
stock market volatility, hence, we set V art−1[A
η
t] = 0.152. Fig. 6 shows
that the investment-uncertainty relation is positive in larger areas: the fact
that wealth is riskier reinforces the risk-aversion eﬀect, leading households
to increase savings in a larger portion of the parameter space.28 Panels (b)
and (c) shows that, with the transition matrixes Λ￿ and Λ￿￿, the investment-
uncertainty relation is negative when Γt = {0.11, 0.22, 0.67}.
4.3.3 Comparisons with representative agent economies
The comparison between the heterogeneous agents economy and the rep-
resentative agent one provides interesting insights.
The dashed line in Fig. 7 relates the highest risk aversion that is com-
patible with a negative investment-uncertainty relation in a representative
agent economy with capital depreciation, which is increased from 0.05 to
0.50 by step of 0.05.29 The other parameters are those discussed in Section
4.1.
As for the heterogeneous agents case, we chose the transition matrix
Λ￿; our routine, holding ﬁxed to 0.7 the risk aversion for the low risk averse
28As conﬁrmed by our numerical simulation, the equilibrium portfolio share are not
remarkably altered by the higher values chosen for the volatility, because risk aﬀects all
the types of agents.
29To obtain the dashed line, we let all the agents to be characterized by a relative risk
aversion of 0.6; the relative risk aversion index is then increased by steps of 0.01. Notice
that this choice implies that ¯ θ and σ varies as a function of the depreciation parameters
to keep Et−1[(A
η
t − δ)] = 0.07, and V art−1[A
η
t ] = 0.0352 (refer to Eq. (15)).























Figure 7: Thresholds values for the average risk aversion.
agents, increases the γi of the two other groups. In particular, for the in-
termediate group the increase in γ2 is 0.01436 in each step, while for the
highly risk-averse group we let ∆γ3 ￿ 0.14455. This choices imply that the
average risk aversion — computed using the wealth shares Γt = {0.11, 0.22,
0.67} — increases by 0.1 in each step. The ratio between the increments has
been chosen so that, when γ2 = 2.2, γ3 is equal to 15.8. Accordingly, this
choice encompasses the benchmark vector for γ. The routine stops when an
average risk aversion allowing for a positive investment-uncertainty relation
is found; because an high heterogeneity in the γi slows down the conver-
gence, the routine terminates the computations — even if the investment-
uncertainty is still negative — when the average risk aversion index reaches
18, which is well above the values usually suggested by the empirical liter-
ature. In Fig. 7, the continuous line depicts the threshold values for the
heterogeneous agents case.
Three remarks are in order. First, this exercise conﬁrms that, for re-
alistic values of the depreciation parameter, heterogeneity in the relative
risk aversion implies that the investment-uncertainty relationship is nega-
tive. Actually, when δ ≤ 0.20 a positive relation requires an average risk
aversion higher than 18. Second, the average γ allowing for a negative
31 31relation decreases with δ.30 As highlighted in Proposition 2, the higher the
depreciation parameter, the smaller is the possibility to invest in risky as-
sets. Finally, notice that the threshold values for the case of homogeneous
risk aversion are higher than those reported by Saltari and Ticchi (2007).
In fact, the ratio of the expected return to its standard deviation in that
paper is much higher than the one in our simulations.31 This acts against
the eﬀect driving our results, because — being the investment in equities
less risky — the heterogeneity in portfolio choices is lower.32
5 Concluding remarks
With a realistic distribution for the relative risk aversion index, our model
generates, in a competitive environment, a negative impact of an (unex-
pected) increase in uncertainty on aggregate investment. Accordingly, we
provide a theoretical basis to interpret the negative investment uncertainty
relationship which has been identiﬁed in the empirical literature. Notice,
in this respect, that the microeconometric literature ﬁnds such a negative
relation valid also for ﬁrms (or sectors) characterized by a low degree of
irreversibility or market power.
The channel we identify is new: in our heterogeneous agents model, the
aggregate risk is born by the individuals who stand it better. Accordingly,
the risk-aversion eﬀect loses much of its clout, and the ﬂexibility eﬀect
induces a reduction in savings and investment.
Our results are important in several respects. Our model helps to ex-
plain why an increase in uncertainty, such as the one that followed Sep-
tember 11, 2001, or the large oil shocks of the seventies, can slow down
aggregate investment. Consider then that aggregate productivity growth
is often linked to investment, either in new production methods or directed
to the introduction of new goods. Extending our framework to take into
account an endogenous productivity growth, we would obtain that it is
reduced by an increase in uncertainty, which is realistic. Furthermore, a
30A similar result is found in Femminis (2008), who adopts a partial equilibrium
framework with a representative agent who maximizes a CRRA utility.
31They let ¯ θ vary between 0.1 and 0.4, while the standard deviation for θt ranges from
0.05 to 0.5. These choices imply a much higher equity return: the minimum value for
Et−1[(A
η
t − δ)] implied by these ranges of values is slightly above 0.36.
32For a representative agent economy, maintaining ¯ θ = 1 and σ = 0.05 as in the ﬁrst
case depicted by Saltari and Ticchi (2007, p. 635), we obtained the following thresholds
δ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
γ 1.13 1.11 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.01 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.91 ,
which corresponds up to the second decimal to those reported in that paper.
32 32better understanding of the investment-uncertainty relationship bears rel-
evant policy implications, in fact the design of a proper stabilization policy
should take into account how the responsiveness of investment is aﬀected
by aggregate uncertainty.
33 33Appendix A: Attainment of the value function
Exploiting the guess (10) into the ﬁrst order condition (8), one obtains:




















where Kt+1,i has been taken out of the expectation operator Et[.] exploiting
the fact that capital stocks are known at the end of period t. The expression
above readily simpliﬁes to:

















Exploiting the budget constraint (7) and the fact that w = φ, the above
equation becomes

















× (ρ(At,Γt,qt,i)Kt,i − (Ct,i − φLt,i)).
Solving for Ct,i − φLt,i yields














































The optimality condition above, and the fact that w = φ, allow to












Exploiting the optimality condition (A.1) and our guess (10) in problem
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Recall that, at the end of period t, the time t+1 wealth distribution is




= ψs(Γt+1)1−γs. Exploiting Eq. (A.2) to



































































Taking advantage of the deﬁnition for Ξjs(Γt+1), the second group of
36 36addenda in the right hand side of the equation above can be written as
β



















    

.










































































Consider that, at the end of period t − 1, the time t capital stock is
known, notice moreover that, from the vantage point of any single agent









































Accordingly, our guess is veriﬁed when:

         
         
ψj(Γt)1−γj = Et−1

































which corresponds to Eqs. (11-12) in Sub-section 3.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
First, we show that qt,i ≤
1+r(Γt)
δ+r(Γt). If qt,i >
1+r(Γt)
δ+r(Γt), ρ(At,Γt,qt,i) takes
a negative value when the lowest realization for A
η
t takes place. In fact
ρ(At,Γt,qt,i) = (1+A
η
t −δ)qt,i +(1+r(Γt))(1−qt,i), and ρ(0,Γt,qt,i) < 0
when qt,i >
1+r(Γt)
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38 38and notice that, because Et [A
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* * * * *
qt,i=0
=
= (1 + r(Γt))
−γj Et[A
η
t − δ − r(Γt)] > 0.
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. In fact, when the denominator in (B.1) exists in
the whole support for A
η







expectation in the last line of (B.1) is positive, being the expected value of
the square of a random variable. ￿
Appendix C: The homogeneous agent economy
The representative agent assumption considerably simpliﬁes our problem.
In this case, in fact, each agent is constrained to hold only capital (i.e
qt,i = 1,∀i). Accordingly, the budget constraint (1) becomes
Kt+1 = (1 + A
η
t − δ)Kt + wLt − Ct,
where the now redundant suﬃx i has been omitted. In this particular
case ρ(At,ωt,qt,i) boils down to (1+A
η







1−γ ∀j,s. The function ψj(Γt) specializes to
a constant ψ, because — since qt = 1 for all agents — the families’ wealth
shares do not aﬀect the portfolio choices and hence the consumption and
































































which can be solved for ψ, obtaining:

















This is the solution obtained by Saltari and Ticchi (2007), Eq. (11), p.
628.
In particular, for the special case δ = 1, we obtain:





















































Recalling that At+1 = Aeθt+1 with θt+1 ∼ N(¯ θ−0.5σ2,σ2), and exploit-








































= sign((1 − R)(η(1 − γ) − 1)) = sign((1 − R)(α − γ)),
which is the result obtained in Saltari and Ticchi (2007). Notice that the
second factor on the right hand side of the equation above captures the
ﬂexibility eﬀect through α and the risk-aversion eﬀect through γ. When
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is lower than unity (and hence
R > 1) an increase in uncertainty reduces the future capital stock, and
hence investment, only if γ < α. The empirical evidence suggests that this
can hardly be the case.
Appendix D: An alternative parameterization for risk
aversion
Kimball et al. (2009) analyze the participants to the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics 1996, with an age comprised between 20 and 69. Assuming
that the relative risk aversion is lognormally distributed, they estimate
an average of 4.2, and a standard deviation of 4.5. Using three Gauss-
Hermite quadrature points, one can approximate a log-normal distribution
for the relative risk aversion with the vector γ = [0.64, 2.86, 12.94] and
the frequencies {0.1¯ 6, 0.6¯ 6, 0.1¯ 6}.






















































































































t,1 + Γ 
t,2 = 1 Γ 
t,1 + Γ 
t,2 = 1 Γ 
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t,2 = 1
Figure 8: Panels (a), (b) and (c) display where the investment-uncertainty
relation is positive, for Λ, Λ￿ and Λ￿￿, respectively.
The shaded areas in Fig. 8 indicate where the investment-uncertainty
relation is positive, when no portfolio constraint is considered, and when
the variance of productivity disturbance is set to match the GDP volatility.
Hence, the exercises summarized in Fig. 8 correspond to the ones depicted
in Fig. 2, but for the diﬀerences in the distribution for the relative risk
aversion parameter. In all the panels, when the share of wealth belonging
to low-risk averse families is 16.¯ 6% and the portion of wealth owned by
families characterized by the intermediate risk aversion level is 66.¯ 6%, an
unexpected increase in uncertainty reduces investment.
Adding the constraint qt,j ≤ 2 in a variant of the model otherwise char-
acterized by the benchmark parameterization and by γ = [0.64, 2.86, 12.94],
gives the results shown in Fig. 9. The portfolio constraint reduces the
area in which the investment-uncertainty relationship is negative, but this
eﬀect is not strong enough to reverse the result concerning the investment-
uncertainty relation when Γt = {0.1¯ 6, 0.6¯ 6, 0.1¯ 6}. Not surprisingly, this
result is stronger than the one described in the main text (and depicted
in Fig. 5): for that parameterization, we obtained a negative investment-
uncertainty relation only for the transition matrixes Λ￿ and Λ￿￿. In fact,
the estimate for the average risk aversion in Kimball et al. (2009) is signif-
icantly lower than the one in Barsky et al. (1997).33
Finally, the output variance is matched with the variance of returns. As
explained in Sub-section 4.3.2, this reinforces the risk-aversion eﬀect aﬀect-
ing the highly risk averse agents, so that the increase in savings dominates
for a larger portion of the parameter space. Nonetheless, the investment-
uncertainty relation is always negative for Γt = {0.1¯ 6, 0.6¯ 6, 0.1¯ 6}. Again,
33The results for qt,j ≤ 4 is omitted, since this case is more favorable to a negative
investment uncertainty relation than the one with qt,j ≤ 2.
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Figure 9: Panels (a), (b) and (c) display where the investment-uncertainty
relation is positive under portfolio constraint qt,j ≤ 4, for Λ, Λ￿ and Λ￿￿,
respectively.






















































































































t,1 + Γ 
t,2 = 1 Γ 
t,1 + Γ 
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t,2 = 1
Figure 10: Panels (a) and (b) and (c) display where the investment-
uncertainty relation is positive when Et−1[(At − δ)] = 0.152, for Λ, Λ￿,
and Λ￿￿ respectively.
this result which is stronger than the one described in the main text.
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